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A Colorado River Basin Authority:




The history of the Colorado River Basin has been marked
by competition and contentiousness among states and interest
groups and by extraordinary assertions of federal power. Rights
to quantities of water have been allocated through a mix of
interstate compacts, an international treaty, legislation,
contracts and judicial decisions.
Water is controlled by an extensive plumbing system
constructed and operated by the United States Bureau of
Reclamation. Several major dams are operated according to the
Secretary of the Interior's judgment as to how much water should
be stored and when water should released. The goal is to serve
an optimum mix of uses. In the past this has meant producing as
much hydropower as possible consistent with storing water to meet
future compact obligations. Today there are growing
constituencies calling for operation of river facilities to meet
diverse and often conflicting demands including flood control,
water quality, Indian rights, fish and wildlife and recreation.
The original concept of federal investment in
development of the Colorado River was to achieve certain national
purposes through bestowing major regional benefits. Neither the
interests of the federal treasury nor single, narrow interests of
some of the potential beneficiaries were to be paramount. Yet
there was no mechanism to consider and balance competing demands,
resolve differences among them and anticipate future problems of
river management.
Pressures to produce more benefits from a limited,
probably declining resource put all present and potential users
in increased competition with one another. The seven basin
states, the Department of the Interior, Indian tribes, Mexico,
power customers, conservationists, recreational users, municipal
and agricultural users, and property owners all have a stake in
how the river is operated in the future. It is insufficient to
leave the resolution of these matters to ad hoc responses by the
parties most interested in particular issues as they arise.
Decisions tend to be made hastily, based on the volume and
political weight of opinion. The court of first and last resort
is the Secretary of the Interior, with occasional appeals to a
typically reluctant Congress whose involvement is usually limited
to appropriating money.
A Colorado River Basin Authority is needed to manage
the river to achieve and distribute its bounties throughout the
basin for broad public benefit. The Authority would be concerned
with hydropower production, meeting compact and treaty demands,
resolving compact disputes, spending and distributing revenues
from the basin funds for water development, conservation, and
habitat protection measures, deciding on operating criteria,
considering interstate water marketing proposals, facilitating
Indian water rights negotiations, drought planning and response,
improving protection for fish and wildlife resources, including
endangered species, and improving and carrying out salinity
control efforts.
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Transition," 59 Colo. L. Rev. 551 (1988).
4. G. Weatherford and F. Brown, eds., New Courses for
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II. Decision-making in the Colorado River Basin
A. The Secretary of the Interior
1.	 Boulder Canyon Project Act (authorizing Hoover
Dam) gives Secretary authority to contract for
storage and delivery of water when and where he
sees fit and to generate and contract for electric
power. 43 U.S.C. § 617d.
a.	 Need not follow state water law in choosing
water users or setting contract terms.
2
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 564, 586-590
(1963).
b.	 Must follow certain preferences, limits on
term, and requirements for cost recovery in
'entering power contracts. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617c
and 617d.
2.	 Colorado River Storage Project (authorizing Glen
Canyon Dam and other facilities) empowered
Secretary to set long-range operating criteria for
federal reservoirs on the river. 43 U.S.C. §
1552.
a. Certain statutory limitations include giving
preference to Mexican Treaty obligations,
meeting upper basin requirements for
deliveries to lower basin, non-impairment of
upper basin annual consumptive uses, and
equalizing storage in Lake Mead (Hoover) and
Lake Powell (Glen Canyon).
b. Original operating criteria and subsequent
modifications submitted to governors of seven
basin states and others chosen by Secretary
for "review and comment". 43 U.S.C. §
1552(b).
c. Purpose is to comply with Colorado River
Compact, Upper Basin Compact and Mexican
Treaty. Nevertheless, Secretary's discretion
in curtailing storage for domestic and
agricultural uses so that he could make
releases to satisfy power generation
contracts was upheld notwithstanding.
preference for domestic and agricultural uses
over power production in Compact (Article
IV(b)) and in the Act (§ 1501). Yuma Mesa
Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Udall, 253 F.
Supp. 548 (D.D.C. 1964); Yuma County Water
Users Ass'n V. Udall, 231 F.Supp. 548 (D.D.C.
1964).
d.	 Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
cases brought by a basin state to enforce
requirement that federal officials and
agencies comply with Law of the River. 43
U.S.C. § 1551(c).
3. The Salinity Control Act authorizes Secretary in
cooperation with the Secretary of Agriculture and
Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency to proceed with an elaborate program of
construction and other activities to enhance water
quality in the river. A portion of the costs are
paid out of basin fund from electric power sales
and repayment of water project costs. 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1571-1599.
B. upper Colorado River Commission
1. Commission established under Article VIII of Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact comprised of one
representative of each of the four upper basin
states and one designated by the President. 63
Stat. 31 (1949).
2. Powers are limited to doing studies, collecting
data, estimating runoff, maintaining gaging
stations, and to making findings as to quantities
of water used in upper basin states, deliveries of
water to lower basin, reservoir losses and
drought-caused problems in meeting Mexican Treaty
requirements.
C. Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency
1. Clean Water Act requires the Environmental
Protection Agency to set standards for
concentrations of pollutants in waters of the
United States and (directly or by delegation to
states) to carry out a permit program for point
sources of pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
2. The Act also requires states to take sufficient
action to protect overall water quality for
existing and future uses. If a state fails to
take sufficient action the Administrator may adopt
and enforce his or her own standards. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1313(c) and 1312.
3. To date, the Administrator has elected to defer to
the states' collective decision to deal with
salinity in the Colorado River through the
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum. The
Administrator's discretion to do so was upheld in
Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275
(D.C.Cir. 1981).
D. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum
	
1.	 Congress passed Colorado River Salinity Control
Act in 1974 to authorize several structural
projects to remove or prevent sources of salt
loading in the river that were causing conflicts
with Mexico and making it difficult to get maximum
use out of water delivered in the lower basin
because of high salt concentrations. 43 U.S.C. §
1591.
	
2.	 Basin states voluntarily (without statutory
direction or authority) created Forum to respond
to requirements of Salinity Control Act and Clean
Water Act:
a. Sets numeric salinity standards for three
checkpoints along the river.
b. Makes recommendations to Secretary of
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture and
Congress on timing, design and construction
of projects under Salinity Control Act.
6
C.	 Develops programs for implementing plan to
meet agreed standards.
d.	 Is largely identical with the membership of
the statutorily authorized Colorado River
Salinity Control Advisory Council which
serves as liaison among and makes
recommendations to federal agencies and
receives reports from the Secretary of the
Interior. 43 U.S.C. § 1594.
III. Proposed: A Colorado River Basin Authority
A. There is an imbalance in decision-making concerning the
river and its resources.
1. Federal agencies have control disproportionate to
their interests.
2. States have only an incidental role but the
massive river developments were intended primarily
to benefit the regional and local interests they
represent.
3. Many important interests and values are not
adequately represented (e.g., environmental,
recreational).
B. The system of reservoirs and hydroelectric facilities
could be the basis for bringing together diverse
interests.
1. Virtually all interests -- governmental and
private -- have a stake in the operation of the
facilities.
2. The facilities could be operated for broad public
benefits in the region.
3. The existing facilities could be operated and
perhaps owned by the Authority.
4. Sufficient revenues could be generated to finance
activities of the Authority as well as to meet
existing repayment obligations.
5. The Northwest Power Planning Council provides a
useful, though not entirely transferable, model.
C. Basinwide issues are growing in number and importance.
IV. Major Basinwide Issues and the Potential Role of a Colorado
River Basin Authority
A. Power generation (and revenues)
1. Power generation systems of the Colorado River
Storage Project (Glen Canyon et al.) and the
Boulder Canyon Project Act (Hoover et al.) are
capable of producing over 30 billion kilowatt
hours of power a year.
2. Charges imposed on power customers for such power
reflect only "costs".
a.	 Statutorily designated obligations such as
current operation, maintenance, repair and
administrative expenses, repayment of certain
project construction costs at low interest
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rates, a portion of the costs of the salinity
control program, specially assessed costs
against Hoover for Central Arizona Project,
and a few other costs.
b.	 Power rates remain low -- 10-14 mills which
is 10-15% the avoided (marginal) cost of
power in western states and about 60% of
Bonneville Power Administration rates.
3. Power marketing activities implicate interests
ranging from existing customers, to potential
customers in the region who are denied cheap power
from the system under current policies, to water
users, environmentalists, recreation interests and
others who are concerned with the tradeoffs
inherent in decisions to generate and market
various levels of power at particular times.
4. Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) -- an
agency of Department of Energy -- has handled
transmission, marketing and other functions since
1978, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7152(a).
5. Whether WAPA is required by the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to prepare an
environmental impact statement for its marketing
criteria is being litigated in Salt Lake City v. 
• Western Area Power Administration and Grand Canyon
Trust v. Western Area Power Administration.
6.	 Colorado River Basin Authority could assume some
functions performed by WAPA.
a. Set marketing criteria.
b. Rate setting authority (now subject to
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
control).
C.	 Projecting demands.
7.	 Authority could have broader functions.
a. Explore options and plan for satisfaction of
demands.
b. Construction and expansion of hydropower
system.




1. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum (see
above) is the single example of successful,
continuous interstate cooperation on a basinwide
issues.
2. Forum (as well as Advisory Council subsumed by it)
has virtually no power but wields considerable
influence because it speaks for basin with single
voice.
3. As cost effective federally financed structural
measures are completed basin states will bear
1 0
greater burden of salinity prevention and clean
Up.
a. Buy out of Wellton-Mohawk may be only
reasonable way to meet Mexican delivery
requirement; remains national obligation.
b. Greater control of salt content for lower
basin uses is likely to fall on states.
c. Harder choices, including reduction of upper
basin cultivation (with appropriate lower
basin compensation), should be worked out
cooperatively by states.
	
4.	 Forum could provide nexus for creation of Basin




1.	 Legal obligations for releases are few:
a. Compact and treaty require 75 million acre-
feet reach Lee Ferry every consecutive ten
year period and 1.5 million acre-feet be
passed to Mexico every year (except in
extraordinary drought).
b. Basin Project Act requires equalization of
storage between Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams.
	
2.	 Bureau of Reclamation has adopted certain
operating policies.
a.	 Storage targets for Glen Canyon are 22.6
1 1
million acre-feet by January 1; full (25
million acre-feet) by July 1.
b. Minimum releases of 3000 cfs in boating
season and 1000 cfs rest of year for
environmental and recreational needs.
c. As far . as possible, all releases are through
power plants, and at hours of highest power
demand.
3. Basin states have a stake in maximizing water
storage to for future consumptive uses pursuant to
compact allocations.
4. States, special interests, the region, and the
nation have competing interests in releasing water
from reservoirs at times and in manners that do
not maximize storage (e.g., flood control, power
generation, fish and wildlife, recreation).
5. There is no mechanism or forum for considering all
the objectives and consequences of the Bureau's
reservoir operating policies.
6. Recreation interests unsuccessfully challenged
Bureau operations that created extreme
fluctuations in flow to detriment of boating and
ecosystems. Grand Canyon Dories, Inc. v. Walker,
500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974).
a.	 Court found Bureau has no legal obligation to
recreation interests.
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r	 b. Question of whether environmental impact
statement must be prepared under NEPA was
left open.
	
7.	 Tension between Bureau of Reclamation proposals to
release water in high water years 1983-84 and
state insistence on retaining as much as possible
led to Reclamation proposals in 1985 to revise
operating criteria.
a. Reclamation proposed a more even release
pattern to produce more power and,
incidentally, enhance channel maintenance;
also slight benefit for flood control in high
flow years.
b. State water managers (delegated by governors)
were given an opportunity to influence
Bureau; other interests, especially power
customers were heard from; no broad
consideration or public debate on multiple
objectives.
c. Reclamation and seven basin states reached
agreement in September, 1987 on modified
technical operating plan for successive year.
	
8.	 Basin Authority could be delegated responsibility
for considering multiple values and objectives
potentially served through operation of reservoir
system.
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a. Goal would be to optimize benefits to basin
states.
b. Only limitations would be compliance with
legal obligations for deliveries and any
overriding national concerns (e.g., flood
control, endangered species protection).
D. Flood control
1. A major justification for federal investment was
the impact of destructive floods early in century.
2. Flood protection became a major issue in the high
water years 1983-1984 -- the first time since
completion of the mainstem reservoirs.
a. First spill from Glen Canyon Dam occurred as
the result of operating system with minimal
flood pool.
b. Large property losses downstream of Hoover
Dam led to congressional hearings on
operating policies and on location of
structures and activities in floodway.
c. Large losses of vegetation and bird and
animal habitat (much of it non-native to the
area) occurred.
d. In spite of near-full condition of
reservoirs, system controlled reasonably well
the highest two years of virgin flows since
records or estimates of flows have been made.
14
r	 3. Basin Authority could serve to coalesce and
express state and regional interests in flood
control.
4. United States will continue to have an interest in
how projects are operated for flood protection;
may require some overriding veto if Basin
Authority acts contrary to national flood control
needs.
E. Water development and management
1. United States is committed to completing several
major water projects in the basin.
a. Central Arizona Project is nearing completion
and provision had been made for most of the
construction costs; most expensive project on
river and in Reclamation system.
b. Dolores Project in Colorado is nearing
completion of construction.
c. Dallas Creek Project in Colorado was
dedicated in 1988, with recreation facilities
still being built.
d. Animas-La Plata Project in Colorado to begin
construction under 1988 Act of Congress (Pub.
L. No. 100-585) approving Colorado-Ute Indian
Water Rights Settlement; large non-federal
share of costs is committed; Congress
proceeding slowly with federal share.
15
e. Central Utah Project is under construction;
accounts for 83% of current expenditures for
projects in Colorado River Storage Project;
recent legislative efforts seek to accelerate
construction and lift cost ceiling along with
increased commitments for fish and wildlife
mitigation and enhancement.
f. Navajo Indian Irrigation Project in New
Mexico is nearing completion but still
accounts for a major share of total
Reclamation spending in basin.
2. It is unlikely that any of the other authorized
federal projects in the basin will ever be built.
3. Though construction of Reclamation projects is
generally thought to be winding down,
appropriations for project construction in the
basin is are at an all time high; the federal
policy is to complete those projects that are
being built but to start no new ones.
4. The basin states have many unmet needs for water
development and management.
a. Projects to maximize use and flexibility of
Reclamation projects.
b. Projects and programs to make existing water
delivery systems more efficient (repair and
rehabilitation of facilities, ditch lining,
16
etc.).
C.	 Dam safety (many publicly and privately
constructed facilities are unsafe; safety
restrictions limit present storage capacity).
d. On farm improvements would improve efficiency
and increase water available for all
beneficial uses through out basin; not
affordable by farmers.
e. Water conservation programs for states, water
districts and municipalities.
5.	 A Basin Authority could allocate funds equitably
for development and management of water by the
basin states through a program of loans and
grants.
a. A proposal for increasing power rates
slightly to provide water development funds
for upper basin states was offered by former
Colorado Governor Richard D. Lamm but
defeated largely because of objections by
public power customer organizations; Basin
Authority would offer broader benefits.
b. Would consider extent to which state was
deprived of historical promise of federal
assistance relative to other states.
c. Benefits to entire region and nation of
particular proposals would be a factor in
17
funding projects (e.g., maximizing
efficiency, effects on salinity, power
generation, environmental values and
recreation).
d. Cost-sharing by state and local beneficiaries
could be required where economically
feasible.
e. Careful use of funds is probable because
total available would be limited.
F. Ecosystems impacts -- management and mitigation
1. Cumulative effects of project development and
operations have not been considered in decision-
making.
2. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) will
apply to Secretary's adoption of new reservoir
operating criteria.
3. Glen Canyon Environmental Studies conducted by
Department of the Interior between 1982-1987.
a. Studies were the result of environmental
assessment on uprating of generators that
attracted extensive public interest and
comment on reservoir operations and of Grand 
Canyon Dories litigation, supra.
b. Purpose was to determine impacts on natural
and recreational resources downstream and
options for reducing negative impacts.
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C.	 Consistent with recommendations by the
National Research council, National science
Foundation, the Secretary initiated a Phase
II of the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies
that will undertake additional technical
studies examining, among other things, the
economic effects of operational changes,
especially with respect to power generation;
Phase III will study the Department of the
Interior decision-making process.
4. A Basin Authority would integrate environmental
factors into all basin policy and decisions, with
participation from affected agencies and interest
groups.
G. Endangered species
1. Development and operation of basin facilities must
be consistent with Endangered Species Act (ESA),
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543.
2. Several indigenous fish species (squawfish,
humpback chub, bonytail chub) are threatened by
continued development of water in the upper basin
and portions of the lower basin; also problems
with eagle habitat in lower basin.
3. Upper basin states and federal agencies have
adopted a Recovery Implementation Plan providing
for reservoir operation changes including releases
19
for the benefit of endangered fish, habitat
improvement, propagation efforts, passage
facilities and establishment of a fund for
recovery efforts; funding comes from Fish and
Wildlife Service appropriations, power revenues,
state contributions and assessments on new private
water developments; water development can proceed
consistent with the Plan.
4. A Basin Authority could administer the Plan and
resolve disputes under it.
5. Similar arrangements accomodating development
needs with ESA compliance could be facilitated by
the Authority elsewhere in the basin.
H. Compact enforcement and interpretation
1.	 Several uncertainties exist under Law of the
River.
a.	 Mexican Treaty issues:
(1) When there is a no "surplus", burden of
Mexican delivery is shared equally
between basins, but "surplus" not
defined.
(2) Are annual deliveries from upper basin
required specifically for Mexico or is
there a credit allowed for deliveries in
excess of compact that are stored or
consumed in lower basin?
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(3) Where must the upper basin's portion of
the Mexican water be delivered (i.e., is
upper basin charged for evaporation and
channel losses)?
b. Meaning of "beneficial consumptive use" --
the basis for allocating quantities of water
between the basins:
(1) net depletion (amount by which natural
flow is depleted by human activity), or
(2) all diversions less all returns (would
not allow for salvage and reuse).
c. Whether Gila River is apportioned by compact.
(1) Left open in Arizona v. California.
(2) Two million acre-feet at stake.
2. Issues have not arisen because upper basin has not
had to utilize its full share of water, lower
basin has only recently reached limits of its
allocation and demands have been accommodated by
above average flows and storage facilities.
3. A Basin Authority could be a forum for negotiating
practical resolutions to ambiguities in the Law of
the River.
21
I.	 Indian reserved rights issues
1	 Much of the law of Indian reserved water rights
has been settled.
a. Quantification on most reservations is to be
based on "practicably irrigable acreage",
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
b. Tribal rights may be decided in state court
general stream adjudications, Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. 800
(1976).
2.	 Some tribes and states in the basin have elected
to negotiate quantity, priority and method of
fulfilling Indian reserved rights (e.g., Colorado,
Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes; Arizona,
Papago, Ak-Chin, Gila River Pima-Maricopa).
a. Can provide "wet water" to tribes if coupled
with measures for acquiring supplemental
water.
b. Non-Indian uses can be protected and their
equities respected.
c. Federal government can fulfill trust relation
by participating financially.
d. Provision can be made for sharing benefits of
Indian water by both Indians and non-Indians
through market transactions.
3.	 A Basin Authority can facilitate future
22
r	 settlements and help resolve inevitable disputes
that will arise under both litigated and
negotiated determinations of reserved rights.
a.	 Quantifications can be tailored to individual
circumstances yet made and administered with
a consistent set of principles in mind.
b	 By collaborating, the states and tribes in
the basin can be more influential in gaining
political acceptance in Congress when it is
considering legislation approving and seeking
federal funding. (Compare the destructive
efforts of some basin interests whose
misapprehensions caused them to oppose the
Colorado Ute Settlement.)
c	 Authority could serve as a vehicle for
funding Indian settlements and determine
appropriate levels of investment of power
revenues in grants and loans for that
purpose.
J. Interstate water marketing
1.	 Proposals for allowing use in one basin state of
water allocated to another have been discussed in
recent years.,
a. Galloway Group scheme to sell water from
Yampa River in Colorado for use in San Diego.
b. Provision in Colorado Ute Indian Settlement
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Agreement allowing marketing on same terms as
other water rights holders.
C. New Mexico's proposal to participate as a
state in marketing groundwater out of state
and Montana's statute involving the state in
all major exports out of major river basins.
2. As faster developing states want the assurance of
a supply and slower developing states seek an
economic return for water to which they are
entitled, mutually beneficial deals become
attractive.
3. The Law of the River neither contemplates nor
forbids interstate water marketing, but consent of
all states is needed to ensure success of any such
proposal.
a. An objecting state whose rights are arguably
affected can bring litigation.
b. The Secretary of the Interior, as operator of
storage and delivery facilities, needs
assurance that the states are in accord
before he administers releases to carry out a
market transaction.
4. A Basin Authority can help negotiate and
administer arrangements under which one or more
states allows its share of river water to be used
by another for a time; the consensus of all basin
24
states is necessary and thus the Authority would
attempt to ensure that each can perceive some
benefit.
K. Planning for drought and climate change
1. Tree ring studies show that the basin has for many
years been spared from historically cyclical
severe, sustained drought, but that it is
eventually inevitable.
2. Mounting evidence shows that the earth is in a
warming trend that will reduce precipitation and
increase evaporation and consumption, causing
Colorado River flows to diminish by as much as
forty percent.
3. Severe drought, exacerbated by global warming,
will put stresses on the Colorado River system
greater than any in the past.
a. Lower basin will not have use of surplus from
upper basin and other sources will be
curtailed as well, causing dislocations and
hampering growth.
b. Upper basin will have only what is left in
river after meeting compact delivery
requirements.
c. Power generation (and thus western power
supplies) will be limited as river facilities
are operated primarily to satisfy water
25
demands.
d. Serious environmental consequences are
possible as habitats dependent on the river
are sacrificed to meet pressing needs of
those (mostly located outside the basin) who
have a call on the river's water.
4. A Basin Authority can plan ahead to meet vitally
important needs of the basin in drought scenarios
of various length and severity.
a. Operations to date, and the rather detailed
allocations under the Law of the River, have
been satisfactory because there has been
plenty of water and less than full demands.
b. An agreement is needed to deal with
contingencies before they arise; it will be
more difficult to make decisions in a time of
crisis.
c. Plans for temporary responses that depart
from the strict allocations of the Law of the
River do not require an abandonment of that
body of law; if left to politics during or
after a major drought, the Law of the River
may undergo serious revision or modification.
L. Allocation and use of basin funds
1.	 Separate lower basin and upper basin "funds" have
been created for bookkeeping purposes to account
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for funds received by the U.S. Treasury in
repayment of certain "reimbursable" project
construction costs.
a. Most (about 98%) of the repayment comes from
power revenues.
b. Small amounts also come from sales of
municipal and industrial water and user fees
for irrigation water.
c. Power revenues have paid for all power
generating facilities in the upper basin
projects and municipal and industrial
revenues have paid for costs allocable to
such water development; all future revenues
from power and M & I sales over costs of
operation, maintenance and repair will be
applied to repayment of irrigation
investments.
2.	 The repayments to the funds are generally on or
ahead of schedule.
a. When all past construction costs are paid off
funds are to continue accruing for further
project construction in the particular basin.
b. Net revenues ostensibly available for future
projects will begin accruing to the accounts
of the upper basin states in about 2015.
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3. A Basin Authority should be required to repay the
federal government all reimbursable project costss
using the same formula now in effect, but only to
the extent of actual federal outlays; surplus
funds would be available to the Authority.
4. Revenues that would accrue to basin funds above
those needed to repay the government plus other
revenues from increased power rates and other
sources would be subject to expenditure by Basin
Authority.
a. Authority would be obliged to make repayments
as stated above.
b. All operation, maintenance and repair costs
would be paid from revenues (either directly
if Authority owned facilities or by contract
if a federal agency, state, water district or
private entity owned the facility).
C. Funds would be spent for all the purposes
outlined above.
d. Authority should have bonding capacity to be
able to maintain and expand power system.
V. Structure of Colorado River Basin Authority
A. Federal legislation would be required
1.	 Congress must consent to delegation of certain
responsibilities that now are assigned to states
(All are assignable to states since they are not
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constitutionally enumerated powers of one of the
three branches of the federal government).
2.	 The Authority will receive certain federal
property of which only Congress may dispose.
B. Unanimous consent of seven basin states is essential
C. An interstate compact (used to establish the Northwest
Power Planning Council) would be highly desirable
1. Would head off constitutional challenges.
2. Would strengthen state commitment and ensure
permanency.
D. All significant basin governments and interests should
be represented in governance of the Authority
1. State and tribal governments should determine
majority of members.
2.	 Interests to be represented include:
a. Water users.
b. Power customers.
c. Fish and wildlife.
d. Recreational users.
3. Federal agencies should designate certain members
based on their special interests in carrying out
national policies (e.g., flood control, fish and
wildlife, recovery of federal investments, Indian
trusteeship, Mexican treaty obligation).
E. The public should have ample opportunities to be
informed and participate
29
1. Planning and decision-making processes should be
open to public input.
2. Decisions should be made in public meetings with
advance notice.
F. A set of strongly worded principles should direct the
Authority to optimize the multiple objectives that the
Colorado River, its resources and facilities are
capable of achieving.
30
